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COMMENTS
The Writ of Prohibition in Pennsylvania
I. Introduction
Essential to the proper administration of justice within any
system of courts consisting of appellate levels' is the requirement that
the actions of each inferior court be confined to its lawful powers or
jurisdiction.2 To enforce this requirement the common law has long
provided' the extraordinary remedy at law4 known as the writ of
prohibition. The writ of prohibition is the process by which a
superior court prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or persons
from usurping or exercising jurisdiction with which they have not
been legally vested.' Its function is to restrain or prohibit an offend-
ing court from continuing its unwarranted conduct when continuation
threatens imminent harm6 to the individual 7 on whose behalf' the
1. The adjudicative process of the common law has been conducted by means
of trial and appellate courts since the eleventh century. Hughes & Brown, The Writ
of Prohibition, 26 GEO. L.J. 831, 834 (1938) [hereinafter cited as Hughes & Brown].
2. Schlesinger v. Musmanno, 367 Pa. 476, 483, 81 A.2d 316, 319 (1951); In
re McNair, 324 Pa. 48, 64, 187 A. 498, 505 (1936). An inferior court is considered
to be acting outside its jurisdiction when it conducts a proceeding over which it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction and when it acts in excess of its authority within a pro-
ceeding over which it has subject-matter jurisdiction. See notes 77-97 and accom-
panying text infra.
3. See notes 24-37 and accompanying text infra.
4. Other extraordinary remedies at law are certiorari, habeas corpus, manda-
mus, procedendo, and quo warranto. The term "remedy" is actually a misnomer as
applied to the writ of prohibition since the function of prohibition is more accurately
described as preventive than remedial.
5. Commonwealth v. Homka, I Pa. D. & C.2d 685, 686 (C.P. (Q.S.) Phila.
1954). This is the universally accepted definition. E.g., Huggins v. Mulvey, 160
Conn. 559, 560, 280 A.2d 364, 365 (1971); People ex rel. Sokoll v. Municipal Court,
359 Ill. 102, 107, 194 N.E. 242, 244 (1935); Smith v. Tuman, 262 Minn. 149, 154,
114 N.W.2d 73, 77 (1962); County of Hillsborough v. Superior Court, 109 N.H. 333,
334, 251 A.2d 325, 326 (1969); Swanson v. Swanson, 8 N.J. 169, 181-82, 84 A.2d
450, 453 (1951); Lee v. County Court, 27 N.Y.2d 432, 436, 267 N.E.2d 452, 454,
318 N.Y.S.2d 705, 708 (1971); State ex rel. Arey v. Sherill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 585,
53 N.E.2d 501, 507 (1944); Boggess v. Wood, 96 Okla. Crim. 378, 379, 255 P.2d
952, 953 (1953); State ex rel. Smith v. Blackwell, 500 S.W.2d 97, 99 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1973); Hatley v. Lium, 126 Vt. 385, 386, 231 A.2d 647, 648 (1967).
6. Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 98, 61 A.2d 426,
428 (1948).
7. The petitioner who seeks a writ of prohibition to restrain a court order
need not be a party to a proceeding before that court. County of Carbon v. Leiben-
sperger, 439 Pa. 138, 139, 266 A.2d 632, 633 (1970).
8. The American common law holds that the petitioner's rights against injury
through unauthorized exercise of judicial power is the primary interest the writ of
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writ is issued. The severity of the writ's effect9 makes its issuance
proper only in those cases in which no other relief is adequate. 10
The writ of prohibition has existed throughout the entirety of
Anglo-American jurisprudence. It has been a part of English law for
over nine centuries" and most American states have expressly grant-
ed their high courts jurisdiction over proceedings in prohibition. 2
Despite its universal existence and the general acceptance of its
fundamentals, however, the writ remains an object of confusion."
The decisions reveal a surprising number of conflicts concerning even
fundamental principles. These include whether prohibition is pri-
marily preventive or remedial in nature14 and whether its issuance
should be governed by equitable maxims even though it is a remedy
at law.' 5 Controversy also exists about the definition of judicial or
prohibition is intended to protect. The English view, in contrast, conceives of pro-
hibition as primarily safeguarding the jurisdiction of a superior court from encroach-
ment by such exercise. Hughes & Brown, supra note 1, at 840-41.
9. E.g., In re McNair, 324 Pa. 48, 52, 187 A. 498, 500 (1936).
10. Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 102, 61 A.2d 426,
430 (1948); accord, Wasmund v. Nunamaker, 277 Minn. 52, 151 N.W.2d 577, 579
(1967); State ex rel. Masterson v. Ohio State Racing Comm'n, 164 Ohio St. 312, 315,
130 N.E.2d 829, 831 (1955). Other forms of relief include the remedies at law of
appeal and certiorari and the equitable remedy of injunction. Because prohibition
can be invoked only when all other forms of redress are inadequate or unavailable,
it has been described as "more extraordinary than any of the other extraordinary
remedies." 3 K. DAvis, ADMNISTRTrIVE LAw T TISE § 24.04, at 419 (1958).
11. Hughes & Brown, supra note 1, at 841.
12. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 10; FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 3; ILL. CONST. art.
6, § 4(a); LA. CONST. art. 7, § 2; NEV. CONST. art. 6, § 4; N.M. CONST. art. 6, §
3; OHIO CoNsT. art. 4, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 4; TEx. CONST. art. 5, § 3; VT.
CONST. art. 4, § 2; W. VA. CONST. art. 8, § 3.
In Pennsylvania § 201 of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17, § 211.201 (Supp. 1975), grants the supreme court original jurisdiction of all
cases of prohibition to courts of inferior jurisdiction. The superior court is granted
original jurisdiction of prohibition cases ancillary to matters within its appellate juris-
diction under § 301 of the Act. Id. § 211.301. The commonwealth court also has
authority to issue the writ in aid of its appellate jurisdiction through the interaction
of § 8(g) of the Commonwealth Court Act, id. § 211.8(g), and § 401 of the Appel-
late Court Jurisdiction Act, id. § 211.401. See notes 138-73 and accompanying text
infra.
13. There is no legal remedy, no common law writ, of which so much that
is erroneous has been written, in text books and in certain classes of judicial
decisions in America, as that of the remedy by writ of prohibition.
Wehle & Belcher, Prohibition in Florida, 4 U. FLA. L. REv. 546 (1951), quoting from
Cooper, The Remedy by Prohibition in Florida As Affected by Some Recent Supreme
Court Cases, 2 FLA. ST. B. Ass'N L.J. 6, 11 (1928).
14. Compare Bennett v. District Court, 81 Okla. Crim. 351, 357, 162 P.2d 561,
564 (1945), with State ex rel. Hamer v. Stackhouse, 14 S.C. 417, 427-28 (1880);
cf. Jacobson v. Superior Court, 1 Ariz. App. 342, 342-44, 402 P.2d 1018, 1018-20
(1965).
15. Compare Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 102, 61
A.2d 426, 430 (1948), with Family Court v. Department of Labor & Indus. Rel., 320
quasi-judicial; the writ properly can be issued only to restrain tribun-
als or officers within that classification. 6
These conflicts arise not only between jurisdictions, but also
within them and, in at least one instance, within the same case.
17
Their existence can be explained partially by the writ of prohibition's
extraordinary nature, which makes litigation regarding its issuance
rare18 and reduces opportunities for analytical comment. 19  For ex-
ample, in 1930 the subject of prohibition was said to be "almost
unexplored" in Pennsylvania."° That appraisal is still accurate. Al-
though several recent decisions 21 of the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania have noted procedural errors by petitioners who confused pro-
hibition with other forms of relief, the court itself has difficulty with
the same questions.22  Because the great majority of proceeding in
prohibition go unrecorded beyond entry on the court's miscellaneous
docket,2 3 the situation is aggravated. Thus, the practitioner wishing
to inform himself about the writ and its proper function has na
complete source of information.
Notwithstanding the infrequency of litigation concerning the
writ of prohibition, a discussion of its use and function is not merely
A.2d 777, 780 (Del. Ch. 1974). There is also a dispute concerning the frequency
with which the writ should be issued; some decisions encourage its use while others
will issue it only with reluctance. See notes 182-89 and accompanying text infra.
16. See notes 190-201 and accompanying text infra.
17. Jacobson v. Superior Court, 1 Ariz. App. 342, 342-44, 402 P.2d 1018, 1018-
20 (1965). Most surprising is the lack of acknowledgment within the cases of any
conflict whatever. No discussion appears of a majority or minority view concerning
these questions.
18. Two members of the Florida bar predicted that only ten percent of their
brethren would encounter writs of prohibition during their careers. Wehle & Belcher,
Prohibition in Florida, 4 U. FLA. L. REV. 546 (1951). Only forty-one decisions on
proceedings in prohibition have been reported in Pennsylvania since the earliest re-
ported case in 1898. See note 23 infra.
19. See Hughes & Brown, supra note 1, at 831.
20. Windolph, The Writ of Prohibition, 3 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 6 (1930) [hereinafter
cited as Windolph]. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had no occasion to
rule upon the constitutionality of its own jurisdiction of cases in prohibition until
1948. Similarly, in 1941 the New Jersey Supreme Court knew of only three actions
in prohibition in its entire history. Carrick v. First Criminal Court, 126 N.J.L. 598,
599, 20 A.2d 509, 511 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird,
360 Pa. 94, 99, 61 A.2d 426, 428 (1948).
21. Borough of Akron v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 453 Pa. 554, 567,
310 A.2d 271, 276 (1973); County of Carbon v. Leibensperger, 439 Pa. 138, 140,
266 A.2d 632, 638 (1970); Chemical Nat. Res. Inc. v. Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 146,
215 A.2d 864, 869 (1966); Commonwealth v. Caplan, 411 Pa. 563, 568, 192 A.2d
894, 896 (1963).
22. The learned Justices have oversimplified the distinctions between the ex-
traordinary writs of mandamus and prohibition. See notes 108-23 and accompanying
text in! ra.
23. The practice of the supreme court is to record decisions regarding petitions
for writs of prohibition in the official reports only if the petition was filed in response
to a threatened act by a lower court within a proceeding already on appeal to the
supreme court. Most proceedings in prohibition do not come within this category.
Telephone conversation with Procedural Rules Committee of the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, March 6, 1975.
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academic. Prohibition is a useful device that can provide extraordi-
nary relief when no other remedies are adequate. This comment will
address the aforementioned problems by examining the black-letter
principles governing writs of prohibition and by analyzing areas of
dispute with emphasis on decisions of the Pennsylvania courts.
II. Historical Considerations
A. English Background
Many elements of the present writ of prohibition have remained
unchanged since its earliest development. 24  The writ can be traced to
the eleventh century2" when the English monarch presided over the
country's highest judicial tribunal, the Aula Regis.26  He would issue
the writ to forestall attempted encroachments upon his sovereign
jurisdiction.27 The most frequent use of the writ during the next few
centuries was to thwart bitter attempts of the ecclesiastical courts28 to
24. For an exhaustive analysis of the development of the writ of prohibition
in England see Hughes & Brown, supra note 1; Wolfram, The "Ancient and Jusf'
Writ of Prohibition in New York, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1952) [hereinafter cited
as Wolfram].
25. Hughes & Brown, supra note 1, at 832; Wolfram, supra note 24, at 334.
26. This court was comprised of the highest officers of the kingdom including
the lord chamberlain and the chancellor, who served as secretary to the king and reg-
istrar of all decrees of the court. The court did not convene at any permanent loca-
tion; rather it accompanied the king on all expeditions. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES *38-39; Hughes & Brown, supra note 1, at 834.
27. Those courts that exceeded their authority in attempting to implement the
rule prevailing at the time that "every good judge should enlarge his jurisdiction" ran
afoul of the prerogative writ. The king's subsequent delegation of the duty of issuing
writs to his secretary, the chancellor, gave rise to the theory that the writ has its ori-
gins in chancery and that prohibition is properly considered a proceeding in equity
rather than at law. This theory is erroneous, however, since at that time the chancel-
lor represented a part of the law courts and the court of chancery had not yet evolved.
See Planters Ins. Co. v. Cramer, 47 Miss. 200, 202 (1872); 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES *38; Allen, Mandamus, Quo Warranto, Prohibition, and Ne Exeat, 1960
U. ILL. L.F. 102, 109; Hughes & Brown, supra note 1, at 834.
28. The ecclesiastical courts were created by decree of William the Conqueror.
They were administered by churchmen and had jurisdiction over all religious matters.
The Constitution of Clarendon in 1164 declared that the common-law courts had the
power to determine the limits of their own jurisdiction. By implication this meant
that the ecclesiastical courts were inferior and, thus, subject to writs of prohibition.
3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *113; Hughes & Brown, supra note 1, at 832; see
State ex rel. McNamee v. Stobie, 194 Mo. 14, 50, 92 S.W. 191, 215 (1906); Pennsyl-
vania Labor Rel. Bd. v. Butz, 411 Pa. 360, 363, 192 A.2d 707, 709 (1963); Wolfram,
supra note 24, at 335. A humorous sidelight to this otherwise acrimonious contro-
versy is provided by Coxeter v. Parson, 88 Eng. Rep. 1283 (K.B. 1699), in which
a distinction about what constituted an action in libel that could properly be tried
by the ecclesiastical courts was drawn. Chief Justice Holt stated that calling a
clergyman a knave would be actionable, but calling him a blockhead or a fool would
usurp the jurisdiction of the king's tribunals. Thus, from its earliest
days prohibition represented an extraordinary and prerogative power
of the supreme judicial authority to be used only when no other
remedy "savoring less of monarchial arbitrariness"29 was available.
Eventually public protest over the arbitrary decisions of ambi-
tious officials who conducted the business of the Aula Regis,"° as well
as King John's suspicion of their power,"1 led to that court's decline.
It was "broken into distinct courts of judicature"312 known by their
status and location as the high courts at Westminster-the king's
bench, the court of common pleas, and the exchequer.3 3  The king's
bench, so named to indicate that it was the sovereign tribunal of the
monarch,34 was granted the king's power of superintendence over all
other courts.3 5 This included authority to issue extraordinary writs,
such as the writ of prohibition.36 Blackstone observed, "The juris-
diction of this court .. .is very high and transcendent. It keeps
all inferior jurisdictions within the bounds of their authority, and may
either remove their proceedings to be determined here, or prohibit
their progress below. .... ,,. 7
B. Pennsylvania Background
The Judiciary Act of 1722'8 created Pennsylvania's judicial
system and conferred upon the new supreme court supervisory power
not. He analogized to a case in which a judge was described as baffle-headed and
could not obtain redress. See Windolph, supra note 20, at 9.
29. Pennsylvania Labor Rel. Bd. v. Butz, 411 Pa. 360, 363, 192 A.2d 707, 709-
10 (1963).
30. These officials were known as chief justiciars. Hughes & Brown, supra
note 1, at 834.
31. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, Comam TA'rmns *39.
32. Id. at *40.
33. Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 99, 61 A.2d 426,
428 (1948).
34. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 4*41. Although the monarch was theo-
retically to preside over the court personally, the last to do so was James 1. Id. at
-K41 n.p.
35. For early examples of the exercise of this supervisory power see King v.
Justices of Yorkshire, 101 Eng. Rep. 352, 353 (KB. 1794); Queen v. Yarrington, 91
Eng. Rep. 353 (Q.B. 1710).
36. Although theoretically only the king's bench had jurisdiction to issue the
king's prerogative writ, the court of common pleas was given the power to do so
under certain circumstances. Eventually the court of chancery also assumed jurisdic-
tion over prohibition equally with the two common-law courts. This movement by
chancery was strongly opposed by Coke. W. HAWKINS, A TREATISE ON THE PLEAS
OF THE CROWN 292 (1788); Hughes & Brown, supra note 1, at 833; Windolph, supra
note 20, at 8.
The high English Court of Common Pleas must not be confused with the much
less powerful courts of common pleas of the current Pennsylvania judicial system.
These Pennsylvania courts lack any jurisdiction over prohibition. Pennsylvania
Labor Rel. Bd. v. Butz, 411 Pa. 360, 365, 192 A.2d 707, 710 (1963); cf. Alberts v.
Bradley, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 107, 111 (C.P. Alleg. 1956).
37. Commonwealth v. Onda, 376 Pa. 405, 408-09, 103 A.2d 90, 91 (1954),
quoting from 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES -*42 (emphasis added by court).




over inferior courts equivalent to that possessed by the king's bench.39
The supreme court's jurisdiction over proceedings in prohibition was
based on provisions granting that court the power to correct all errors
of the inferior judiciary. 40 These powers were specifically confirmed
and enlarged by the second comprehensive statute pertaining to judi-
cial matters, the Judiciary Act of 1836.41
While the existence of the court's power of the king's bench has
never been disputed,42 the question whether the court was empowered
to issue writs of prohibition became a matter of considerable doubt.
43
The difficulty arose because the first state constitution, the constitu-
tion of 1776, granted the legislature power to determine the limits of
the supreme court's jurisdiction." The legislature made such a
determination within the constitution of 1874 when it expressly limit-
ed the scope of the supreme court's original and appellate jurisdic-
tions to certain enumerated powers that did not include prohibition.45
Provincial Act of 1722. See Petition of Squires & Constables Ass'n, 442 Pa. 502,
512, 275 A.2d 657, 662 (1971); In re Carbon County Jud. Vacancy, 292 Pa. 300,
302, 141 A. 249, 250 (1928).
39. Act of May 22, 1722, 1 SM. L. 131, ch. 255, § 6 (proviso, 2-3) states,
mhe said judges, or any two of them, shall have full power to hold the
said court, and therein to . . . examine and correct all and all manner of
errors of the justices and magistrates of this province ....
. . . [The judges are] hereby granted concerning all and singular the
premises according to law, as fully and amply, to all intents and purposes
whatsoever, as the justices of the court of King's Bench, common pleas and
exchequer at Westminster, or any of them, may or can do.
Similar legislation has conferred the powers of the king's bench upon the highest
court of many states. E.g., Fouracre v. White, 31 Del. 25, -, 102 A. 186, 196 (Su-
per. Ct. 1917); Carrick v. First Criminal Court, 126 N.J.L. 598, 604, 20 A.2d 509
(Sup. Ct. 1941); In re Public Util. Comm'r, 201 Ore. 1, 16, 268 P.2d 605, 610
(1954). See also 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *45 n.6 (S. Tucker ed. 1803)
(Virginia courts possess powers of the king's bench).
40. Act of May 22, 1722, 1 SM. L. 131, ch. 255, § 6 (proviso, 2-3).
41. Act of June 16, 1836, P.L. 784, No. 192, § 1 (repealed 1970); Common-
wealth v. Onda, 376 Pa. 405, 409, 103 A.2d 90, 91 (1954); Appeal of Geary, 316
Pa. 342, 346, 175 A. 544, 545 (1934); Commonwealth v. McGinnis, 2 Whart. 112,
117 (Pa. 1837).
42. E.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Philadelphia County, 331 Pa. 177, 178, 200 A.
598 (1938); Commonwealth v. Ickhoff, 33 Pa. 80, 81 (1859).
43. Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 101, 61 A.2d 426,
429 (1948), discussed in notes 52-62 and accompanying text infra.
44. Commonwealth v. Balph, 111 Pa. 365, 384, 3 A. 220, 232 (1886) (dissent-
ing opinion).
45. PA. CoNsr. art. 5, § 3 (1874) (emphasis added) read in relevant part as
-follows:
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend over the State and
the judges thereof . . . shall have original jurisdiction in cases of injunction
where a corporation is a party defendant, of habeas corpus, of mandamus
to courts of inferior jurisdiction, and of quo warranto as to all officers of
the Commonwealth whose jurisdiction extends over the State, but shall not
exercise any other original jurisdiction; they shall have appellate jurisdiction
Thereafter, the supreme court's power to prohibit unwarranted ac-
tions by its inferior tribunals was dependent upon whether the powers
conferred upon the court at its creation continued in force despite
subsequent constitutional limitations.
The court's first opportunity to address this issue came in
1898.46 At that time, however, the court merely assumed its jurisdic-
tion over the exercise of prohibitory power without comment about its
authority. 47  The supreme court's next recorded opinion on prohibi-
tion in 192848 asserted that the power of prohibition had "never been
taken from [this court],"4 9 but like its predecessor, it failed to refer
to the apparent constitutional conflict.50 The court subsequently
relied upon its 1928 statement to rebuff similar jurisdictional chal-
lenges"' until Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird52 in 1948.
In that case respondents to a petition for a prohibitory writ forced
resolution of the constitutional issue by alleging it as a defense.5" The
court ruled that authority for its exercise of prohibitory power was not
derived from the 1874 constitution;54 rather, it stemmed from the
Judiciary Act of 1722, which created the supreme court and granted
it the powers of the king's bench, including the sovereign power of
superintendency over inferior tribunals and the concomitant power to
issue writs of prohibition.55 The court concluded that this conferral
of powers at the time of the court's creation caused them to vest
immediately and, therefore, made exercise of prohibitory power im-
mune from any subsequent attempts at constitutional or statutory
limitation.56
by appeal, certiorari or writ of error in all cases as is now or may hereafter
be provided by law.
46. In re DeWalt, 40 A. 470, 471 (1898). This case was not recorded in the
official reports.
In addition to the writer's research, substantial evidence exists that there had
been no action in prohibition before the supreme court until 1898. In 1928 a com-
mon pleas court noted that "[tihere are no decisions in Pennsylvania throwing light
on the question whether the common law writ of Prohibition can be issued in this
state." Noah v. Jacoby, 77 Pitts. 461, 462 (Pa. C.P. 1928). The court cited only
In re DeWalt; presumably it could find no other case. Likewise, in 1930 a con-
tributor to the Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly knew of no case earlier than
DeWalt. Windolph, supra note 20, at 6. Further support is found within the opinion
of Chief Justice Maxey in In re Philadelphia County Grand Jury, 347 Pa. 316, 330,
32 A.2d 199, 204 (1943). Dissenting from the majority's issuance of a writ of prohi-
bition in that case, he substantiated a vehement protest with an exhaustive descrip-
tion of the proper use of prohibition in several jurisdictions, but did not cite a Penn-
sylvania case earlier than In re McNair, 324 Pa. 48, 187 A. 498 (1936).
47. In re DeWalt, 40 A. 470 (1898).
48. In re First Cong. Dist. Election, 295 Pa. 1, 144 A. 735 (1928).
49. Id. at 13, 144 A. at 739.
50. Id.
51. In re McNair, 324 Pa. 48, 64, 187 A. 498, 505 (1936).
52. 360 Pa. 94, 61 A.2d 426 (1948).
53. Id. at 100, 61 A.2d at 429.
54. Id. at 99, 61 A.2d at 428-29.




The court's ruling was pragmatic since it would have been
ludicrous for the supreme court on a close constitutional question to
deprive itself of its most powerful means of supervising inferior
tribunals. The decision, however, reveals the strained rationale of a
court struggling to reach the conclusion it desired. The idea that the
court's prohibitory power is sovereign over any constitutional or
statutory proscriptions is subject to question. In reaching its conclu-
sion the court impliedly and without acknowledgment reversed a
number of its previous decisions."* The reversed cases had held that
the court possessed powers of the king's bench only to the extent that
they had not been removed "by express terms or irresistible implica-
tion" ' or "by . . . state and Federal constitutions."59  The 1874
constitutional provisions that specifically gave the court certain king's
bench powers and expressly denied it all others clearly qualified
under those tests.
Additionally, the court had to circumvent a prior decision that
declared that its exercise of original jurisdiction was limited by the
1874 constitutional provision. 0 The court did so by reasoning that
prohibition is not an exercise of original jurisdiction, but an act of
"revisory appellate jurisdiction" that is beyond the statutory ambit.61
Despite its questionable reasoning, Carpentertown, nevertheless, clear-
ly resolved that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has always pos-
sessed the authority to issue writs of prohibition.62
57. Commonwealth v. Jones, 303 Pa. 551, 555, 154 A. 480, 482 (1831); Car-
bon County Jud. Vacancy, 292 Pa. 300, 302, 141 A. 249, 250 (1928); In re Mulhol-
land, 217 Pa. 631, 632, 66 A. 1105, 1106 (1907); Commonwealth v. Balph, 111 Pa.
365, 380, 3 A. 220, 229 (1886); Chase v. Miller, 41 Pa. 403, 411 (1862); Gosline
v. Place, 32 Pa. 520, 523 (1859); Commonwealth v. McGinnis, 2 Whart. 113, 155
(Pa. 1837); Overseers of the Poor v. Smith, 2 S. & R. 362, 365 (Pa. 1816).
58. In re Mulholland, 217 Pa. 631, 632, 66 A. 1105, 1106 (1907); Chase v.
Miller, 41 Pa. 403, 411 (1862); Overseers of the Poor v. Smith, 2 S. & R. 362, 365
(Pa. 1816).
59. Commonwealth v. Jones, 303 Pa. 551, 555, 154 A. 480, 482 (1931); Com-
monwealth v. Balph, 111 Pa. 365, 377, 3 A. 220, 227 (1886).
60. Commonwealth v. Balph, 111 Pa. 365, 379-80, 3 A. 220, 227 (1886).
61. Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 101, 61 A.2d 426,
429 (1948).
62. The determination in Carpentertown that the supreme court exercises re-
visory appellate jurisdiction in adjudicating a proceeding in prohibition is another vi-
able, pragmatic result reached through doubtful reasoning. Within the case the court
contradicted itself twice on this issue. The court first stated that prohibition is not,
strictly speaking, an exercise of original jurisdiction. Presumably this was done to
avoid applicability of the alleged constitutional limitation on the court's original juris-
diction. Yet, the court immediately thereafter declared prohibition to be the exact
counterpart of mandamus. By so doing it reversed itself; mandamus is considered
an exercise of original jurisdiction. The court then changed its course again by con-
479
III. Description of the Writ
A. Nature
The writ of prohibition is a superior court's direct order com-
manding an inferior court to restrain its unwarranted action."3 Courts
are divided on the question whether prohibition is better described as
a preventive 64 or a remedial65 device. The validity of one description
over the other depends upon whether the writ is viewed as correcting
an act already begun or preventing its continuation. Since the evil to
be avoided is the harm to the petitioner if the action continues, 66
prohibition is more accurately described as preventive.6 7
A proceeding in prohibition tests the jurisdiction of the inferior
court. 68 Therefore, the proceeding is always a civil action regardless
of whether the litigation in which the alleged judicial misconduct
occurred is civil or criminal.69 Furthermore, it is not an action
between the parties to the controversy below 70 nor between a superior
and an inferior court. Rather, it is an action between the petitioners
and the inferior court.
7 1
cluding that prohibition is an exercise of revisory appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 101,
61 A.2d at 429.
63. West Penn Power Co. v. Goddard, 460 Pa. 551, -, 333 A.2d 909, 913
(1975); Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 98, 61 A.2d 426, 428
(1948).
64. Jackson v. Calhoun, 156 Ga. 756, 759, 120 S.E. 114, 116 (1923); State ex
rel. Hamer v. Stackhouse, 14 S.C. 417, 427-28 (1880); Windolph, supra note 20, at
S.
65. Thompson v. Hart, 382 P.2d 758, 759 (Okla. Crim. App. 1963).
66. See note 8 supra.
67. Pennsylvania courts have adopted this view. Carpentertown Coal & Coke
Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 98, 61 A.2d 426, 428 (1948). A comparison of the two
terms as judicially defined supports this contention. Preventive is defined as "hinder-
ing, frustrating, or prohibiting." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1352 (rev. 4th ed. 1968)
(emphasis added). The meaning implied is the obstruction of something not yet
completed. Remedial is defined as "giving the means of offering redress." Schultz
v. Gosselink, 260 Iowa 115, 118-19, 148 N.W.2d 434, 436 (1967), quoting BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1457 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). This implies that the wrongful conduct
has already occurred. Prohibition cannot correct a wrong that has already occurred.
68. Pirillo v. Takiff, - Pa. -, -, 341 A.2d 896, 899-900 (1975); see note
5 and accompanying text supra.
69. J. HIGH, A TREA71SE ON EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES 554 (2d ed.
1874) [hereinafter cited as HIGH]; Hughes & Brown, supra note 1, at 846.
70. Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 98, 61 A.2d 426,
428 (1948); accord, Commonwealth ex rel. Watson v. Montone, 227 Pa. Super. 541,
546, 323 A.2d 763, 766 (1974); Marchand v. Probate Court, 123 Vt. 187, 191, 186
A.2d 85, 87 (1962).
71. The inferior court is called a respondent. Chemical Nat. Res., Inc. v. Ven-
ezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 141, 215 A.2d 864, 866 (1966). The black-letter rule states that
a prohibition proceeding is one between a superior court and an inferior court. E.g.,
Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 98, 61 A.2d 426, 428 (1948).
This is misleading, however. The issue whether a writ should issue is contested be-
tween the petitioner and the inferior court he seeks to prohibit. Only when the su-
perior court issues a writ and blocks the threatened action of the lower court can the
proceeding be considered "between" the two courts.
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Some debate exists about the type of jurisdiction exercised by the
court that hears a prohibition proceeding. It is often described as
original jurisdiction,72 which is accurate in the sense that the court
before which the proceeding is conducted must adjudicate both fac-
tual and legal disputes. 3 On the other hand, since the proceeding
necessarily must arise from ongoing litigation or judicial action, it is
not an exercise of original jurisdiction in a strict sense. 74  Addition-
ally, the supervisory power that the petitioner seeks to invoke closely
resembles the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.75 Yet, because there
is no lower court judgment to review, the proceeding cannot be de-
scribed accurately as within the appellate jurisdiction of the superior
court. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has developed a viable
compromise to this dilemma by describing its jurisdiction over pro-




Prohibition is invoked to prevent inferior judicial or quasi-
judicial bodies from assuming unwarranted jurisdiction. 77  There-
fore, the key issue in any prohibition case is whether the inferior body
has jurisdiction to take the allegedly wrongful action. 71 If jurisdic-
tion exists, the writ cannot lie because prohibition is not a substitute
for an appeal. 79  Even a defendant's absolute immunity from liability
does not warrant exercise of prohibition to halt the proceedings if a
court properly has jurisdiction. The determinative question is not
whether the court is empowered to provide a remedy to the plaintiff,
but whether it can hear the controversy.8 °
72. Appeal of Hamilton, 407 Pa. 366, 372, 180 A.2d 782, 785 (1962).
73. This is the definition of original jurisdiction. Commonwealth v. Balph,
111 Pa. 365, 383, 3 A. 220, 231 (1886).
74. Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 100, 61 A.2d 426,
429 (1948); Commonwealth v. Ronemus, 205 Pa. 420, 424, 54 A. 1095, 1097
(1903).
75. See Commonwealth v. Balph, 111 Pa. 365, 382, 3 A. 220, 231 (1886);
Commonwealth v. Baldi, 147 Pa. Super. 193, 197, 24 A.2d 76, 78 (1942).
76. Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 100, 61 A.2d 426,
429 (1948); see note 62 supra.
77. Pirillo v. Takiff, - Pa. -, -, 341 A.2d 896, 899-900 (1975); see note
5 and accompanying text supra.
78. Commonwealth v. Mellon Natl Bank & Trust Co., 360 Pa. 103, 107-08,
61 A.2d 430, 433 (1948).
79. West Penn Power Co. v. Goddard, 460 Pa. 551, -, 333 A.2d 909, 913
(1975) (prohibition improper even when party lost right to appeal by failing to pros-
ecute appeal within time prescribed).
80. Chemical Nat. Res., Inc. v. Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 143, 215 A.2d 864,
This black-letter principle must be considered, however, in light
of the broad meaning given to the term "jurisdiction" for purposes of
determining when unauthorized conduct has occurred."' The most
blatant exercise of unwarranted jurisdiction occurs when a court
initiates a proceeding even though it lacks even the slightest authority
over the subject matter and parties. This is considered a lack of
jurisdiction8 2 and prohibition clearly lies to restrain further action by
the court.13  In addition, courts have construed the term "jurisdic-
tion" expansively -to find that unwarranted jurisdiction -has been
exercised when an inferior court, which has jurisdiction over the
subject matter and parties, acts in excess of its authority while adjudi-
cating the controversy. 4  This is termed an abuse of jurisdiction. 5
The majority of decisions also consider this latter type of judicial
misconduct sufficient grounds for issuance of a writ of prohibition.86
For example, in Schlesinger v. Musmanno8 7 a common pleas judges
hearing a mundane trespass action attempted to bar plaintiff's attor-
ney from participating in the case until the attorney admitted or
denied his alleged membership in the Communist Party. 9 The judge
obviously had jurisdiction to decide the trespass action, but clearly
867 (1966); Vendetti v. Schuster, 418 Pa. 68, 71, 208 A.2d 864, 866 (1965); Mc-
Williams v. McCabe, 406 Pa. 644, 648, 179 A.2d 222, 224 (1962).
81. This is the general rule in Pennsylvania and other jurisdictions. E.g.,
United States Alkali Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 203 (1944); State ex rel.
McNamee v. Stobie, 194 Mo. 14, 42, 92 S.W. 191, 199 (1906); Commonwealth ex
rel. Specter v. Shiomos, 457 Pa. 104, 107, 320 A.2d 134, 136 (1974); State ex rel.
Pabst v. Circuit Court, 184 Wis. 301, 304, 199 N.W. 213, 214 (1924).
82. One example of lack of jurisdiction would be if "a justice of the peace, em-
powered to hear only petty cases such as those involving traffic law violations, were
to summon parties before him in order to decide whether a divorce decree should be
granted." GELLHORN & BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 138 (1970), quoted in Borough
of Akron v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 453 Pa. 554, 561, 310 A.2d 271, 275
(1973).
83. Abelleira v. District Court, 17 Cal. 2d 280, 288, 109 P.2d 942, 947 (1941).
84. E.g., Commonwealth v. Smart, 368 Pa. 630, 639, 84 A.2d 782, 787 (1951);
Schlesinger v. Musmanno, 367 Pa. 476, 483, 81 A.2d 316, 319 (1951); Carpenter-
town Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 102, 61 A.2d 426, 430 (1948); accord,
Abelleira v. District Court, 17 Cal. 2d 280, 288, 109 P.2d 942, 947 (1941); Lee v.
County Court, 27 N.Y.2d 432, 437, 267 N.E.2d 452, 454, 318 N.Y.S.2d 705, 708
(1971).
85. Commonwealth v. Smart, 368 Pa. 630, 639, 84 A.2d 782, 787 (1951).
86. E.g., Commonwealth v. Smart, 368 Pa. 630, 639, 84 A.2d 782, 787 (1951);
Schlesinger v. Musmanno, 367 Pa. 476, 483, 81 A.2d 316, 319 (1951). Contra,
Commonwealth v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 360 Pa. 103, 107, 61 A.2d 430,
433 (1948). The view expressed in Mellon Bank is that mere jurisdiction over the
subject matter is sufficient to preclude an action in prohibition for alleged misconduct
within the proceeding. This view, however, does not conflict with the majority rule
because the question addressed in Mellon Bank was whether mere error by the court
would sustain a petition for prohibition. The question whether an abuse of jurisdic-
tion would be sufficient was not discussed.
87. 367 Pa. 476, 81 A.2d 316 (1951).
88. The judge in this case was the Hon. Michael A. Musmanno, who later
served as a Justice on the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania from 1951 until his death
in 1968. See 99 PENNSYLVANIA MANuAL 494-95 (E. Brittingham ed. 1969).




lacked jurisdiction to inquire into the attorney's political affili-
ation. The supreme court issued a writ of prohibition to block
the judge's inquiry and the citation of contempt he sought to impose
for the attorney's refusal to answer.90
Abuse of jurisdiction must be distinguished from abuse of dis-
cretion. To constitute an abuse of jurisdiction, the act must be done
without any authority. An abuse of discretion, on the other hand,
occurs when a court has authority to take a certain course of action,
but does so erroneously or unreasonably."' An abuse of discretion is
reviewable on appeal;92 therefore prohibition generally does not lie to
restrain this type of judicial action. 93  Under certain circumstances,
however, even an abuse of discretion can be subject to a proceeding in
prohibition, such as when a petitioner has no other adequate remedy
available to him. 94 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently has
supplanted the traditional inquiry of a prohibition proceeding into the
inferior court's jurisdiction with a two-legged test in which the
adequacy of other remedies and the necessity of the circumstances are
the determinative criteria. 95 Typically the necessity issue arises in
criminal cases96 in which the trial court has exercised its discretion by
allowing discovery of prosecution evidence by the defendant. If the
accused prevails on the merits, the prosecution has no right of appeal
from the court's discovery order. Thus, in Pennsylvania the prosecu-
tion is allowed to petition for prohibition of that order, although at
least one Justice has noted that this is not, strictly speaking, a proper
exercise of the extraordinary writ.
97
90. Id. See Pirillo v. Takiff, - Pa. -, -, 341 A.2d 896, 899 (1975).
91. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 25 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
92. See Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Shiomos, 457 Pa. 104, 110-11 n.1,
320 A.2d 134, 137 n.1 (1974) (Pomeroy, J., concurring).
93. Id. See also 108 U. PA. L. REv. 449, 456 (1960).
94. This approach reflects the American common-law view that the paramount
interest to be protected by the prohibitory power is the petitioner's. See note 8 supra.
95. Pirillo v. Takiff, - Pa. -, -, 341 A.2d 896, 899 (1975); West Penn
Power Co. v. Goddard, 460 Pa. 551, -, 333 A.2d 909, 913 (1975); Commonwealth
ex rel. Specter v. Shiomos, 457 Pa. 104, 107-08, 320 A.2d 134, 135 (1974).
96. E.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Shiomos, 457 Pa. 104, 108, 320 A.2d
134, 136 (1974); Commonwealth v. Caplan, 411 Pa. 563, 568, 192 A.2d 894, 897
(1963).
97. Justice Pomeroy concurred with the majority in Shiomos, which granted the
prosecution a writ of prohibition. He nonetheless remarked,
As a matter of first impression, I would have difficulty agreeing that
the deviation from our rule presented a case of 'extreme necessity' as that
phrase is used in Carpentertown Coal and Coke Co. v. Laird [citation
omitted]. We should, moreover, be zealous not to permit the remedy by
prohibition to be utilized to review what may be, in essence, an exercise of
discretion by the trial court.
He noted that the court previously had upheld exercise of the prohibitory power
Prohibition also is used to review an exercise of discretion when
a petitioner seeks to terminate a grand jury investigation by alleging
that the lower court erred in deciding to convene it.98 Although no
explanation is given within the reported cases, the probable rationale
of the supreme court in granting the writ in this type of case is to
provide an adequate remedy when otherwise none would exist. With-
out prohibition the petitioner would be subject to the burdens of a
grand jury investigation that on appeal might be held void ab initio.99
Restraint of these proceedings is the most frequently reported use of
prohibitory power in Pennsylvania. 100
The subject of a grand jury investigation has several grounds
upon which to base a petition to prohibit the proceeding ab initio.'0'
One ground is that the averments of alleged criminal activity upon
which the lower court convened the grand jury were insufficiently
specific to justify this action."0 2 The strict requirements for conven-
tion of an investigative grand jury indicate the vulnerability of the
judge's decision to a claim of abuse of discretion. Specific offenses
must be alleged by the court or district attorney and these allegations
must have an adequate factual basis. 0 3 A second ground for prohibi-
tion may exist if memorialists0 4 file the petition to institute a grand
jury investigation. Unless the memorialists have an interest in the
investigation greater than that of the general public, they cannot
under such circumstances. Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Shiomos, 457 Pa. 104,
110-11 n.1, 320 A.2d 134, 137 n.1 (1974).
98. E.g., In re Philadelphia County Grand Jury, 347 Pa. 316, 320, 32 A.2d 199,
201 (1943); In re Investigation by Dauphin County Grand Jury, 332 Pa. 289, 291,
2 A.2d 783, 792 (1938); In re McNair, 324 Pa. 48, 52, 187 A. 498, 500 (1936).
99. Chief Justice Maxey vigorously argued against this view, contending that
an alleged abuse of discretion cannot properly sustain a writ of prohibition especially
within the context of grand jury proceedings. In re Philadelphia County Grand Jury,
347 Pa. 316, 326, 32 A.2d 199, 204 (1943) (dissenting opinion).
100. Petition of Specter, 455 Pa. 518, 317 A.2d 286 (1974); Commonwealth ex
rel. Camelot Det. Agency v. Specter, 451 Pa. 370, 303 A.2d 203 (1973); Common-
wealth v. McCloskey, 443 Pa. 117, 277 A.2d 764 (1971); Smith v. Gallagher, 408
Pa. 551, 185 A.2d 135 (1962); Petition of Grace, 397 Pa. 254, 154 A.2d 592 (1959);
Commonwealth v. Smart, 368 Pa. 630, 84 A.2d 782 (1951); In re Philadelphia
County Grand Jury, 347 Pa. 316, 32 A.2d 199 (1943); In re Investigation by
Dauphin County Grand Jury, 332 Pa. 289, 2 A.2d 783 (1938); In re McNair, 324
Pa. 48, 187 A. 498 (1936).
101. Prohibition has been described as "the most efficient means of protection
from unlawful grand jury investigation initiated as a result of abuse of lower court
discretion." 108 U. PA. L. REV. 449, 457 (1960).
102. Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 443 Pa. 117, 136, 277 A.2d 764, 774
(1971); Petition of Grace, 397 Pa. 254, 259, 154 A.2d 592, 596 (1959); In re Phila-
delphia County Grand Jury, 347 Pa. 316, 320, 32 A.2d 199, 201 (1943); In re Inves-
tigation by Dauphin County Grand Jury, 332 Pa. 289, 297, 2 A.2d 783, 788 (1938);
In re McNair, 324 Pa. 48, 63, 187 A. 498, 499 (1936).
103. For a spirited argument that an allegation of specific crimes already has
accomplished the purpose of a grand jury investigation, see Chief Justice Maxey's dis-
sent in In re Investigation by Dauphin County Grand Jury, 332 Pa. 289, 308, 2 A.2d
783, 793 (1938).




appeal a denial of their petition. Thus, if a lower court entertains
such an appeal, prohibition will lie to prevent further proceedings. 105
Another use of the writ of prohibition in grand jury investiga-
tions favors the prosecution. After being indicted, a defendant can
seek to quash by alleging prosecutorial improprieties in presentation
of evidence to the grand jury.10 6 If the court grants defendant's
petition to offer testimony in support of his motion to quash, the
prosecutor can request a writ of prohibition to restrain the proceed-
ing. The writ will be issued unless defendant's averments are based
upon specific, sworn statements of witnesses to the alleged miscon-
duct.1
07
C. Comparison with Other Forms of Relief'0
1. Mandamus.-Apart from the basic difference between the
extraordinary writs of mandamus' °9 and prohibition-the former
commands and the latter restrains action by inferior bodies or per-
sons, the two are quite similar. In Hohfeldian terms, mandamus
cannot properly be issued unless the petitioner demonstrates a refusal
to act in accord with a clear duty owed him,1 0 while prohibition is
taken by presenting a memorial for the court's consideration. Appeal of Hamilton,
407 Pa. 366, 369, 180 A.2d 782, 785 (1962) (Cohen, J., concurring).
105. Appeal of Hamilton, 407 Pa. 366, 371, 180 A.2d 782, 784 (1962).
106. Commonwealth v. Smart, 368 Pa. 630, 639, 84 A.2d 782, 786 (1951).
107. Id. at 637, 84 A.2d at 786. In reaching its decision the supreme court bal-
anced the conflicting interests of maintaining the grand jury's traditional secrecy and
preserving the defendant's right to proceed with his claim. Accord, Pirillo v. Takiff,
- Pa. -, -, 341 A.2d 896, 900 (1975).
108. The extraordinary writs of quo warranto and certiorari are not considered
here because they lack similarity with prohibition. Quo warranto is the means by
which validity of an officer's title can be challenged, as opposed to his jurisdiction
to perform a certain act. Comment, Quo Warranto in Pennsylvania: Old Standards
& New Developments, 80 DIcK. L. REv. 218 (1976). Certiorari, unlike prohibition,
acknowledges that the lower court had jurisdiction in the matter and is merely a peti-
tion for review. Windolph, supra note 20, at 7-8. Certiorari, however, is similar to
prohibition in that both are considered exercises of revisory appellate jurisdiction.
Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 100-01, 61 A.2d 426, 429
(1948); Commonwealth v. Ronemus, 205 Pa. 420, 424, 54 A. 1095, 1097 (1903);
Commonwealth v. Balph, 111 Pa. 365, 382, 3 A. 220, 230 (1886).
109. Mandamus is defined as
an extraordinary writ which lies to compel the performance of a ministerial
act or a mandatory duty where there is a clear legal right in the plaintiff,
a corresponding duty in the defendant, and a want of any other appropriate
and adequate remedy.
Valley Forge Racing Ass'n v. State Horse Racing Comm'n, 449 Pa. 292, 295, 297
A.2d 823, 824-25 (1972).
110. Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Dennis, 10 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 439,
442, 308 A.2d 915, 916-17 (1973).
485
not applicable unless it can be shown clearly that there is no right to
take the action threatened."' The two extraordinary writs are also
similar in their relationships to the exercise of discretion. Mandamus
can be used against an unwilling judge to compel an exercise of
discretion, but not to compel a particular result." 2 It can be used to
review discretion only when the discretion was fraudulent, arbitrary,
or based upon an error of law."' Likewise, prohibition theoretically
cannot be used to review the exercise of discretion. (As has been
noted, however, prohibition sometimes is used, with proper caution,
to restrain an abuse of discretion when no other remedy is ade-
quate)." 4  Relief through either mandamus or prohibition is inap-
propriate when less extraordinary relief is adequate'" and when the
action sought to be mandated or prohibited is already completed." 6
Comments by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania accentuate
these similarities. The court has described prohibition as "the exact
counterpart of mandamus"' 17 and has referred to differences between
the two as "semantical only.""" Caution must be exercised in ac-
cepting the court's proffered maxims, however, because they are only
superficially accurate. While mandamus and prohibition are similar,
failure to observe the basic distinction between the writs and the
circumstances under which each is properly issued will distort the
analysis necessary for determining the propriety of issuing one or the
other under a given set of facts.
A writ of mandamus can issue against either a judicial tribunal
or official or an executive agency or official."' Prohibition will lie
only against the action of a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal. 20 It
cannot be granted to restrain a ministerial action.'' These distinc-
tions affect the issues facing the court before which petitions are
111. Commonwealth v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 360 Pa. 103, 107, 61
A.2d 430, 433 (1948).
112. McKean, Some Aspects of Judicial Discretion, 40 DICK. L. REV. 168, 171
(1935) [hereinafter cited as McKean].
113. Commonwealth v. Caplan, 411 Pa. 563, 567-68, 192 A.2d 894, 896 (1963).
114. See notes 94-97 and accompanying text supra.
115. Pirillo v. Takiff, - Pa. -, -, 341 A.2d 896, 900 (1975) (prohibition);
Valley Forge Racing Ass'n v. State Horse Racing Comm'n, 449 Pa. 292, 295, 297
A.2d 823, 825 (1972) (mandamus).
116. Since mandamus and prohibition respectively compel and restrain action
before harm occurs, both are most accurately described as preventive devices. See
notes 64-67 and accompanying text supra.
117. Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 100, 61 A.2d 426,
429 (1948).
118. Kremer v. Shoyer, 453 Pa. 22, 28 n.3, 311 A.2d 600, 603 n.3 (1973); cf.
City of Coronado v. City of San Diego, 97 Cal. 440, 441, 32 P. 518 (1893), which
declared that besides the fact that mandamus commands and prohibition restrains, the
two writs have "nothing in common."
119. Kaufman Constr. Co. v. Holcomb, 357 Pa. 514, 520, 55 A.2d 534, 537
(1937); McKean, supra note 112, at 170.
120. See notes 182-218 and accompanying text infra.
121. HIGH, supra note 69, at 554-55. Another distinction in this regard is that
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brought. The petitioner seeking a writ of mandamus must prove
merely that the offending tribunal or officer's refusal to act breaches a
duty. He need not show that the action is executive or judicial, for
that fact is irrelevant. On the other hand, the petitioner desiring a
writ of prohibition must prove both that the conduct threatened is
done without authority and that the tribunal or officer against whom
relief is sought is judicial or quasi-judicial. Thus, the type of act and
the type of actor must be considered. 122 While in most instances the
allegedly offending tribunal is obviously judicial, questions concern-
ing whether a particular administrative body is quasi-judicial and,
therefore, subject to prohibition may be difficult to resolve.123 Be-
cause of these distinctions prohibition applies to fewer fact situations
than does mandamus and the statement that the two are exact coun-
terparts is not completely accurate.
2. Injunction.-The equitable remedy of injunction'24 also
shares many characteristics with the legal remedy of prohibition.' 25
The two remedies are historically related 26 and their general pur-
poses are nearly identical. 27 Both are used to prevent injustice 28 by
restraining further action within an ongoing judicial proceeding and
neither should be issued when another remedy is adequate. 29  Be-
cause of these similarities injunction and prohibition are often con-
fused in much the same manner as are the writs of mandamus and
prohibition. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania frequently has
prohibition issues against the court as a body, whereas mandamus goes against the
officer as an individual. Windolph, supra note 20, at 8.
122. This difference was alluded to by Justice Pomeroy in Kremer v. Shoyer,
453 Pa. 22, 27 n.1, 311 A.2d 600, 601 n.1 (1973).
123. Compare Kovarsky v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 279 N.Y. 304, 313, 18
N.E.2d 287, 290 (1938), with State ex rel. Swearingen v. Railroad Comm'rs, 79 Fla.
526, 531-32, 84 So. 444, 446 (1920); see notes 190-201 and accompanying text infra.
124. Injunction is "the form of equitable proceeding which protects civil rights
from irreparable injury, either by commanding acts to be done, or preventing their
commission, there being no adequate remedy at law." Ladner v. Siegel, 298 Pa. 487,
495, 148 A. 699, 701 (1930).
125. The similarity between prohibition and injunction often results in the latter
being classified as an extraordinary remedy. McKean, supra note 112, at 173.
126. Injunction is believed to have originated during the fifteenth century as an
extension of the prohibition against waste. Goodeson v. Gallatin, 21 Eng. Rep. 346,
346-47 (Ch. 1771); McKean, supra note 112, at 173; Windolph, supra note 20, at
7.
127. Borough of Akron v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 453 Pa. 554, 564,
310 A.2d 271, 276 (1973); County of Carbon v. Leibensperger, 439 Pa. 138, 140,
266 A.2d 632, 633 (1970).
128. Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 98, 61 A.2d 426,
428 (1948); Ladner v. Siegel, 298 Pa. 487, 495, 148 A. 699, 701 (1930).
129. HiGH, supra note 69, at 550.
observed that motions for injunctions "may in fact be imperfectly
framed requests for writs of prohibition.' 80
The similarity between the two remedies, however, is deceiving.
Injunction and prohibition serve different functions in that they seek
to restrain different subjects. 131  An injunction is directed against a
party to restrain his imminent conduct. Any court before which the
instant litigation is pending can properly grant it. Prohibition, on the
other hand, is directed against the court to restrain its further ac-
tion. 132  It can be granted only by a court superior to the one that
allegedly has exceeded its authority. The party requesting an injunc-
tion from the court that is hearing the entire controversy has no
dispute with that court's jurisdiction over the matter. Indeed by his
request he is acknowledging this jurisdiction. 33 In contrast, a party




For purposes of statutory interpretation, however, the supreme
court regards the difference between injunction and prohibition as
130. Borough of Akron v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 453 Pa. 554, 564,
310 A.2d 271, 276 (1973); County of Carbon v. Leibensperger, 439 Pa. 138, 140,
266 A.2d 632, 633 (1970).
131. In re Public Util. Comm'r, 201 Ore. 1, 16, 268 P.2d 605, 610-11 (1954);
HIGH, supra note 69, at 755; Windolph, supra note 20, at 7.
132. People v. Wyatt, 186 N.Y. 383, 394, 79 N.E. 330, 334 (1906); In re Public
Util. Comm'r, 201 Ore. 1, 16, 268 P.2d 605, 610-11 (1954); HIGH, supra note 69,
at 550.
133. Hoffman v. McDonald, 35 West. 199, 201 (Pa. C.P. 1952); HiGH, supra
note 69, at 550.
134. As the Westmoreland County court of common pleas observed,
The writ of prohibition is directed to and operates directly upon the court,
preventing it from exercising a jurisdiction which it does not possess, while
an injunction is directed to the parties and not to the court, and recognizes
the jurisdiction of the court as existing.
Hoffman v. McDonald, 35 West. 199, 201 (Pa. C.P. 1952).
This distinction was also noted by the supreme court in County of Carbon v.
Leibensperger, 439 Pa. 138, 140, 226 A.2d 632, 633 (1970). In that case a justice
of the peace attempted to collect back taxes by mailing each delinquent taxpayer an
"Official Demand Before Suit," which listed the amount owed and assessed nominal
court costs. One recipient paid the delinquency directly to the local tax collector,
who had been named as plaintiff to the suit, without paying the costs. The justice
of the peace thereupon issued a summons. The county filed for and received a pre-
liminary injunction from the court of common pleas. On appeal the supreme court
properly noted that although the suit was brought in equity, it was actually a request
for a writ of prohibition. Since a court of common pleas cannot issue a writ of pro-
hibition, the decree was vacated.
It is not known whether the common pleas court failed to recognize the differ-
ence between injunction and prohibition or simply believed that the justice of the
peace was the actual plaintiff in the threatened proceeding and, thus, felt that injunc-
tive rather than prohibitory relief was appropriate. The latter rationale is suggested
by the lower court's finding it "abhorrent" that the justice of the peace was "suing
for a debt allegedly owing him and bringing the action in his own court .... ." Id.
at 139-40, 266 A.2d at 633 (emphasis added). When a judge deviates from his role
as arbiter of the controversy before him, the distinction between prohibition and in-
junction becomes "shadowy." Windolph, supra note 20, at 10.
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merely semantic. 18 5 In Borough of Akron v. Pennsylvania Public
Utility Commission'36 the court ruled that procedural requirements
with which the commonwealth court had to comply before it could
enjoin the Commission applied equally to issuance of a writ of
prohibition.1
37
IV. Jurisdiction of Pennsylvania Courts To Issue Writs of
Prohibition
After Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird13s the legislature
reaffirmed the jurisdictional claim of the supreme court by expressly
granting that court original jurisdiction of all cases in which writs of
prohibition are sought to bar action of an inferior tribunal.8 9 In
addition, the current constitution states that the "Supreme Court shall
exercise general supervisory and administrative authority over all the
courts and justices of the peace from one court or district to another
as it deems appropriate."'40 The supreme court would be unable to
satisfy this constitutional mandate if it lacked jurisdiction to issue
writs of prohibtion. Thus, the court's holding in Carpentertown,
14
1
the legislature's delineation of the court's jurisdictional powers, and
the mandate of the constitution unquestionably establish the power of
the supreme court to issue a writ of prohibition.
4 1
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania was once only a statutory
court;148 not until 1941 was it granted original jurisdiction in prohibi-
135. Borough of Akron v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 453 Pa. 554, 564,
310 A.2d 271, 276 (1973).
136. 453 Pa. 554, 564-65, 310 A.2d 271,276-77 (1973).
137. Although the commonwealth court held that it lacked jurisdiction over pro-
hibition, the supreme court reversed. Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. Commonwealth, -
Pa. -, -, 340 A.2d 435, 437 (1975); see notes 149-73 and accompanying text infra.
138. 360 Pa. 94, 61 A.2d 426 (1948); see notes 52-62 and accompanying text
supra.
139. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 211.201 (Supp. 1975) states,
The Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction
of:
(1) All cases of habeas corpus;
(2) All cases of mandamus or prohibition to courts of inferior juris-
diction;
(3) All cases of quo warranto as to any officer of statewide jurisdic-
tion.
140. PA. CoNsT. art. V, § 10(a).
141. Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 61 A.2d 426 (1948).
142. While the supreme court's power of prohibition is confirmed by statutory
and constitutional authority, it is not dependent on them. See notes 52-56 and ac-
companying text supra.
143. Appeal of Bell, 396 Pa. 592, 598, 152 A.2d 731, 734 (1959); Martonick
v. Beattie, 383 Pa. 168, 171, 117 A.2d 715, 717 (1955); Commonwealth ex rel. Speer
v. Speer, 267 Pa. 129, 134, 110 A. 268, 269 (1920); Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. Com-
monwealth, 11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 375, 377, 313 A.2d 790, 791 (1973).
tion actions.1 4  Its jurisdiction in prohibition, however, was limited
to actions within its appellate jurisdiction. 4 5  Although the superior
court has been a constitutional court since 1968,146 the relevant
constitutional provision and the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of
1970147 do not alter the limitations on its prohibition jurisdiction. 148
Unlike those of the supreme and superior courts, the powers of
the commonwealth court are limited expressly to those conferred
upon it by statute.149  In Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. Common-
wealth 50 the commonwealth court denied itself jurisdiction over
prohibition proceedings because it felt that this jurisdiction had not
been included in its statutory conferral. 151 Upon appeal, however,
the supreme court reversed, holding that no doubt exists about the
commonwealth court's statutory authority to issue the writ in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction.152
144. Act of May 21, 1941, P.L. 47, No. 28, § 1, as amended, Act of May 8,
1956, P.L. 1540, No. 511, § 1 (repealed 1963) stated,
The Superior Court shall have no original jurisdiction, except in actions
of mandamus and prohibition to courts of inferior jurisdiction where such
actions are ancillary to proceedings within its appellate jurisdiction, and ex-
cept that it, or any judge thereof, shall have full power and authority when
and as often as there may be occasion, to issue writs of habeas corpus under
like conditions returnable to the said court, but it shall have exclusive and
final appellate jurisdiction of all appeals in the following classes of cases
145. Id.
146. PA. CONST. art. V, §§ 1, 3.
147. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 211.101-.510 (Supp. 1975).
148. Id. § 211.301 states,
The Superior Court shall have no original jurisdiction, except in actions
of mandamus and prohibition to courts of original jurisdiction where such
actions are ancillary to matters within its appellate jurisdiction, and except
that it, or any judge thereof, shall have full power and authority when and
as often as there may be occasion, to issue writs of habeas corpus under
like conditions returnable to the said court.
149. The Commonwealth Court Act, id. §§ 211.1-.15, declares at § 211.8(g),
The [commonwealth] court shall have power to issue, under its judicial
seal, every lawful writ and process necessary or suitable for the exercise of
the jurisdiction given by this act and for the enforcement of any order
which it might make, including such writs and process to or to be served
or enforced by sheriffs and other officers of courts and political subdivisions
as the courts of common pleas are authorized by law or usage to issue, and,
except as otherwise provided by general rules, to make such rules and orders
of court as the interest of justice or the business of the court may require.
The Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act, id. H§ 211.101-.510, states at § 211.401,
(a) The Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction of:
(1) All civil actions or proceedings against the Commonwealth or any
officer thereof, acting in his official capacity, except (i) actions or proceed-
ings in the nature of applications for a writ of habeas corpus or post-convic-
tion relief not ancillary to proceedings within the appellate jurisdiction of
the court, and (ii) proceedings under the Eminent Domain Code;
(2) All civil actions or proceedings by the Commonwealth or any offi-
cer thereof, acting in his official capacity, except proceedings under the
Eminent Domain Code;
(3) All civil actions or proceedings original jurisdiction of which is
vested in the Commonwealth Court by section 508 of this act or by any
act of the General Assembly hereafter enacted.
150. 11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 375, 313 A.2d 790 (1973).
151. Id. at 379, 313 A.2d at 792.




The supreme court answered directly two arguments that the
commonwealth court had adopted in ruling that it lacked prohibitory
power. First, the commonwealth court had considered itself bound
by an earlier decision of the supreme court 5" that appeared -to deny
the lower court any jurisdiction over quo warranto (an extraordinary
writ like prohibition)' 5  and to vest this jurisdiction solely in the
supreme court, even though the latter's jurisdiction over extraordinary
writs is "original but not exclusive."' 55 In Bethlehem Mines'56 the
supreme court stated that the earlier decision was "based not on a
statutory grant of original jurisdiction, but on our constitutional
authority over justices of the peace."'
57
The second basis of the commonwealth court's holding in Beth-
lehem Mines""5 was grounded on its analysis of the interaction be-
tween the Commonwealth Court Act and the subsequent Appellate
Court Jurisdiction Act.'5 9 The court noted that the Commonwealth
Court Act grants it authority to issue "every lawful writ and process
necessary or suitable for the exercise of its jurisdiction."' 60 This
appears to empower the commonwealth court to issue a writ of
prohibition in matters ancillary to its jurisdiction in much the same
manner as the superior court.' 6 ' The commonwealth court held,'
62
however, that because the legislature had used express language in
granting prohibitory power to the supreme and superior courts within
the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act,' 63 the lack of an express state-
153. Collins v. Gessler, 452 Pa. 471, 307 A.2d 892 (1973).
154. See note 108'supra.
155. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 211.201 (Supp. 1975) (emphasis added). The
supreme court declared erroneous plaintiff's reliance upon the Appellate Court Juris-
diction Act regarding the jurisdiction of the commonwealth court. Collins v. Gessler,
452 Pa. 471, 475-76 n.3, 307 A.2d 892, 894 n.3 (1973). Yet, no explanation was
offered beyond the statement that "[s]ection 201 of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction
Act, on its face, is controlling in this case." Id. Collins was questioned by the com-
monwealth court in Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Dennis, 10 Pa. Commonwealth
Ct. 439, 448, 308 A.2d 915, 919 (1973), but was followed to preclude the common-
wealth court from exercising jurisdiction in a mandamus action. Specter, in turn, was
held to control the result in Bethlehem Mines regarding jurisdiction over prohibition
actions.
156. Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. Commonwealth, - Pa. -, 340 A.2d 435
(1975).
157. Id. at -, 340 A.2d at 439.
158. Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. Commonwealth, 11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 375,
313 A.2d 790 (1973).
159. See note 149 and accompanying text supra.
160. 11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 377, 313 A.2d at 792.
161. See notes 144-48 and accompanying text supra.
162. 11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 377-78, 313 A.2d at 792.
163. See notes 139, 148 and accompanying text supra.
ment within the Commonwealth Court Act'64 precluded a finding
that the legislature had intended to confer the power on the latter
court.
The supreme court refuted this conclusion in two ways. First, it
assumed that the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act,' 65 in fact, was
silent about the commonwealth court's power over prohibition. Nev-
ertheless, this silence could hardly be read "as indicating a legislative
intent to deny authority to the commonwealth court to issue writs of
prohibition."' 6 6 The Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act contains two
provisions that confer powers on the commonwealth court broad
enough to include prohibition.'67 Therefore, the supreme court not-
ed, the Act's silence about prohibition may indicate merely that the
legislature thought further mention of the commonwealth court's
prohibitory power unnecessary. 168 The supreme court then took the
opposite approach and expressed doubt -that the Act was silent on the
issue at all.' 69 The court noted that the Act granted the common-
wealth court "original jurisdiction over all actions or proceedings
against the Commonwealth,"' 70 another grant of power broad enough
to include prohibition.' 71  The supreme court further noted that the
Act contained exceptions to its grant of original jurisdiction to the
lower court. 1 72  Therefore, if the legislature had intended to exclude
prohibition, it could have done so in like manner.17
The supreme court has determined that Pennsylvania's courts of
common pleas lack all authority to issue writs of prohibition. 74  In
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Butz 75 the court based its
decision on the Judiciary Act of 1722, 17 which created the courts of
common pleas177 as well as the supreme court.'7 8 This act did not
164. See note 149 supra.
165. Id.
166. Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. Commonwealth, - Pa. -, -, 340 A.2d 435,
438 (1975).
167. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 211.8(g)-(h) (Supp. 1975).
168. - Pa. at -, 340 A.2d at 438.
169. Id.
170. See note 149 supra.
171. - Pa. at -, 340 A.2d at 438.
172. See note 149 supra.
173. - Pa. at -, 340 A.2d at 438.
174. Pennsylvania Labor Rel. Bd. v. Butz, 411 Pa. 360, 365, 192 A.2d 707, 709
(1963). Before 1963 the question whether courts of common pleas had authority to
issue writs of prohibition had not been resolved. Two common pleas decisions, Noah
v. Jacoby, 77 Pitts. 461, 462 (Pa. C.P. 1928); Winks v. Arona School Directors, 22
West. 28 (Pa. C.P. 1938), stated in dicta that prohibition could be exercised by such
courts against a quasi-judicial tribunal, to which the court necessarily would be su-
perior. In Alberts v. Bradley, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 107, 111 (C.P. Alleg. 1956), it was
suggested, however, that this reasoning could not properly be extended to authorize
prohibition against the minor judiciary since they are not considered inferior judicial
tribunals within the jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas.
175. 411 Pa. 360, 192 A.2d 707 (1963).
176. Act of May 22, 1722, 1 SM. L. 131, ch. 255.
177. Id. § 1.




confer the powers of the king's bench upon the courts of common
pleas and, therefore, unlike the supreme court these courts did not
acquire prohibitory power. The court in Butz also held that subse-
quent legislative conferral of certain powers of the English Court of
Chancery (which, as one of the three high courts at Westminster,
shared the power of prohibition with the king's bench)179 upon the
courts of common pleas8 0 did not give these courts the power to issue
writs of prohibition.' 8
V. Requirements for Issuance of a Writ of Prohibition
Before a court can decide whether the common-law require-
ments for issuance of the prohibitory writ have been met in any given
case, it must determine the degree of circumspection it will use in its
consideration of the petition. There are two schools of thought. One
view holds that the writ should be issued only reluctantly and under
conditions of extreme necessity.' 82 The opposite opinion states that
application of the writ should be upheld and encouraged wherever
possible.18 3  The former view emphasizes that the writ is an extraor-
179. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
180. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 281 (1962) states,
The several courts of common pleas shall have the jurisdiction and
powers of a court of chancery, so far as relates to:
I. The perpetuation of testimony.
II. The obtaining of evidence from places not within the state.
III. The care of persons and estates of those who are non compos mentis.
IV. The control, removal and discharge of trustees, and the appointment
of trustees and the settlement of their accounts.
V. The supervision and control of all corporations other than those of a
municipal character, and unincorporated societies or associations, and
partnerships.
VI. The care of trust moneys and property, and other moneys, and prop-
erty made liable to the control of the said courts.
And in such other cases as the said courts have heretofore possessed such
jurisdiction and powers, under the Constitution and laws of this common-
wealth.
181. 411 Pa. at 364, 192 A.2d at 710. The Butz court also noted that an absurd
situation would result if the courts of common pleas were allowed prohibitory powers.
Theoretically, the court felt, with this power the lower courts could challenge the ju-
risdiction of the supreme court. Id. This latter analysis overlooked the principle
that a writ of prohibition can issue only from a court superior to the one against
which it is directed.
Mention should be made -here that the former courts of quarter sessions also
lacked jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition. Commonwealth v. Homka, 1 Pa. D.
& C.2d 685, 691 (C.P. (Q.S.) Phila. 1954). For an exhaustive analysis of the ques-
tion see Kroemer v. Commonwealth, 3 Binn. 577, 578-79 (Pa. 1811); 1 J. STEVENS,
A HIsToRY OF THE CIMINAL LAW iN ENGLAND 113-14 (1883).
182. Pirillo v. Takiff, - Pa. -, -, 341 A.2d 896, 900 (1975).
183. Tribune Review Pub. Co. v. Thomas, 120 F. Supp. 362, 374 (W.D. Pa.
1954).
dinary one and that its exercise obviates the normal process of judicial
review. The latter approach also stresses regularity in judicial pro-
ceedings in that liberal use of prohibition prevents unauthorized
encroachments of jurisdiction by inferior courts. Pennsylvania deci-
sions have propounded both views,1 84 but several other jurisdictions
have adopted the liberal approach. Preference for this view stems
from the realization that a hesitant approach to the exercise of
prohibitory power in the initial stage of proceedings simply increases
the frequency with which the remedy subsequently will have to be
used.'" 5 Under the liberal approach courts have issued writs of
prohibition even when the common-law requirements for issuance
were not satisfied.' 8 6
In the vast majority of cases, however, four basic requirements
must be met before a court can'17 issue a writ of prohibition. First,
the court or tribunal against which the writ is directed must be
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial power. Second, the exercise of
this power must be an extension of jurisdiction unauthorized by law.
Third, the exercise of power must threaten injury to the petitioner.
Last, the threatened injury must be one for which no other adequate
remedy exists. 8 The key requirement that the inferior court's exer-
184. Compare Pirillo v. Takiff, - Pa. -, -, 341 A.2d 896, 900 (1975), with
Tribune Review Pub. Co. v. Thomas, 120 F. Supp. 362, 374 (W.D. Pa. 1954).
185. People ex rel. Childs v. Extraordinary Trial Term of Supreme Court, 228
N.Y. 463, 468, 127 N.E. 486, 487 (1920); accord, Petition of DiJoseph, 394 Pa. 19,
23, 145 A.2d 187, 188 (1958), quoting from Commonwealth v. Stepper, 54 Lack.
209, 212-13 (Pa. C.P. 1952).
186. State ex reL Sears v. Romiti, 50 Ill. 2d 51, 54, 277 N.E.2d 705, 706-07
(1971); Lee v. County Court, 27 N.Y.2d 432, 436, 267 N.E.2d 452, 454, 318
N.Y.S.2d 705, 708 (1971).
187. Courts conflict over whether issuance of a writ of prohibition can ever be
a matter of right or whether it remains within the discretion of the issuing court. In
its earliest days prohibition was a matter of right if the inferior court clearly lacked
jurisdiction on the face of the proceedings. 37 MIcH. L. REv. 789 (1939). This
rule, however, was not controlling after the early seventeenth century. Good v.
Good, 124 Eng. Rep. 66 (C.P. 1623). Today, at least one court has stated that the
writ can be had as a matter of right when it is shown that jurisdiction is clearly lack-
ing and no other adequate remedy is available. Family Court v. Department of La-
bor & Indus. Rel., 320 A.2d 777, 780 (Del. Ch. 1974); accord, In re Hughley Mfg.
Co., 184 U.S. 297, 301 (1902); Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 173 (1886). Most
courts, however, including the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, hold that prohibition
is never a matter of right. E.g., Weidel v. Plummer, 243 Minn. 476, 480, 68 N.W.2d
245, 247 (1955); In re Public Util. Comm'r, 201 Ore. 1, 19, 268 P.2d 605, 613
(1954); Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 102, 61 A.2d 426,
430 (1948); Lyons v. Steele, 113 W. Va. 652, 654-55, 169 S.E. 481, 482 (1933). The
distinction between the two views is insignificant since under either view the court
must still exercise discretion in deciding whether jurisdiction is clearly lacking or
whether another remedy is adequate or available.
188. Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Shiomos, 457 Pa. 104, 107-08, 320 A.2d
134, 136 (1974); Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 102, 61 A.2d
426, 430 (1948). E.g., Family Court v. Department of Labor & Indus. Rel., 320
A.2d 777, 780-81 (Del. Ch. 1974); State ex rel. Sears v. Romiti, 50 Ill. 2d 51, 54,
277 N.E.2d 705, 706 (1971); Weidel v. Plummer, 243 Minn. 476, 480, 68 N.W.2d




cise of jurisdiction be unauthorized has already been discussed. 189
This section will examine the other requirements and note differences
among jurisdictions concerning the interpretations thereof.
A. The Meaning of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Power
The writ of prohibition is issued to keep inferior courts within
the proper limits of their jurisdiction. Therefore, prohibition can be
exercised only against judicial or quasi-judicial persons or tribunals.
The separation of powers doctrine' 90 bars preemptory judicial inter-
ference with executive' 9 ' or legislative192 action.1 93
Determining whether judicial or quasi-judicial power is being
exercised by an administrative tribunal is often difficult.'94 The
subtlety of the problem is especially pronounced when public utility
318 N.Y.S.2d 705, 708 (1971); State ex rel. Masterson v. Ohio State Racing Comm'n,
164 Ohio St. 312, 315, 130 N.E.2d 829, 831 (1955); State ex rel. Pabst v. Circuit
Court, 184 Wis. 301, 304, 199 N.W. 213, 214 (1924).
189. See notes 77-97 and accompanying text supra.
190. Hetherington v. McHale, 10 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 501, 510-11, 311 A.2d
162, 167 (1973); accord, Chemical Nat. Res. Inc. v. Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 152,
215 A.2d 864, 872 (1966).
191. Prohibition cannot be used, for example, to restrain the actions of a Gover-
nor. Williams v. Koelsch, 67 Idaho 341, 343, 180 P.2d 237, 238 (1947); Stein v.
Morrison, 9 Idaho 426, 453, 75 P. 246, 255 (1904); Grier v. Taylor, 4 McCord 206,
207 (S.C. 1827). This limitation, however, does not prevent a Governor from peti-
tioning for prohibition against allegedly wrongful judicial involvement in his scope
of responsibility. Stein v. Morrison, 9 Idaho 426, 453, 75 P. 246, 255 (1909); In
re Investigation by Dauphin County Grand Jury, 332 Pa. 289, 2 A.2d 783 (1938);
accord, Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 176 (1886) (writ cannot lie against Cabinet
member).
192. In re Investigation by Dauphin County Grand Jury, 332 Pa. 342, 344, 2
A.2d 802, 803 (1938).
193. The remedy in these cases is not prohibition, but a declaration of the un-
constitutionality of the particular action taken by one of the two branches of govern-
ment. This was the procedure followed in In re Investigation by Dauphin County
Grand Jury, 332 Pa. 342, 344, 2 A.2d 802, 803 (1938). The legislature had enacted
a law forbidding the Dauphin County court of quarter sessions from conducting a
grand jury investigation of alleged official misconduct simultaneously with an inquiry
conducted by a special legislative committee. When the court ordered the witnesses
subpoenaed by the committee not to appear, the supreme court granted the commit-
tee's petition to prohibit the order. Id. In a subsequent proceeding, however, the
supreme court declared the legislation unconstitutional and allowed the two investiga-
tions to proceed concurrently. In re Investigation by Dauphin County Grand Jury,
332 Pa. 342, 358, 2 A.2d 802, 809 (1938).
194. A wide variety of administrative activities have been classified as judicial
or quasi-judicial for purposes of prohibition. 3 K. DAvis, ADMINIsTRATrvE LAW
TREATMSE 416 (1st ed. 1958). Professor Davis questioned the need for these labels.
He contended that the determinative issue should be the extent to which the peti-
tioner needs judicial protection from the threatened action of the administrative body.
Id. at 416-17. This contention reflects the view that relief for the petitioner is the
primary purpose for which a writ of prohibition will issue.
commissions fix rates for regulated utilities and railroads. Courts are
divided on the question whether this action is legislative or judicial in
nature. Decisions holding commission acts at least quasi-judicial
emphasize the discretionary aspects of the rate-making procedure,
especially the allowance of arguments and the weighing of evi-
dence. 195 Decisions holding that this action is legislative stress that
rate-making is within the statutory power of the legislature regardless
of the manner in which it is done.196 No reported Pennsylvania
decision is dispositive of this question. The supreme court has ruled,
however, that an order of a public utility commissioner requiring a
municipality to provide water service to a particular resident was an
exercise of quasi-judicial power.197  A similar ruling was made re-
garding a state mining commission convened to determine damages
for an allegedly improper removal of coal.198
Another question is whether it is sufficient that the action sought
to be restrained is performed by one occupying a judicial position or
whether it is required additionally that the act itself be judicial. The
general rule clearly supports the latter position. 99 The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has not addressed this question directly, but its
holdings that the actions of a judge are not necessarily those of a
court20 0 imply concurrence with the majority view.201
195. E.g., Kovarsky v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 279 N.Y. 304, 313, 18 N.E.2d
287, 290 (1938); Hixon v. Snug Harbor Water & Gas Co., 381 P.2d 308, 310 (Okla.
1963); Oklahoma City v. Corporation Comm'n, 80 Okla. 194, 196, 195 P. 498, 500
(1921); Huntington Chamber of Commerce v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 84 W. Va. 81,
83, 99 S.E. 285 (1919).
196. E.g., ICC v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry., 167 U.S. 479, 499-500 (1897);
Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern Ry., 308 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1962), aff'd, 372
U.S. 658 (1963); Durant v. City of Beverly Hills, 39 Cal. App. 2d 133, 138, 102
P.2d 759, 763 (1940) ("universal rule"); State ex rel. Swearingen v. Railroad
Comm'rs, 79 Fla. 526, 529, 84 So. 444, 445 (1920); accord, Berry v. Lindsay, 256
S.C. 282, 289-90, 182 S.E.2d 78, 83 (1971) (fixing of insurance premium rates held
nonjudicial).
197. Borough of Akron v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 453 Pa. 554, 563,
310 A.2d 271, 276 (1973).
198. Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 101, 61 A.2d 426,
430 (1948). The supreme court denied relief, however, because of the availability
of an appeal from the administrative body's action. One commentator stated that the
reasoning in Carpentertown virtually nullifies possible applicability of prohibition
against such administrative action. Reader, Tudicial Review of "Final" Administra-
tive Decisions in Pennsylvania, 67 DicK. L. Rnv. 1, 23 (1962).
Other jurisdictions have granted a prohibitory writ against a decision of a public
utility commission despite the availability of an appeal. E.g., In re Public Util.
Comm'r, 201 Ore. 1, 19, 268 P.2d 605, 614 (1954).
199. E.g., Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 169 (1886); City of Coronado v.
City of San Diego, 97 Cal. 440, 441, 32 P. 518 (1893); State ex rel. Swearingen v.
Railroad Comm'rs, 79 Fla. 526, 529, 84 So. 444, 445 (1920); Crow v. Board of
Sup'rs, 135 Cal. App. 451, 458, 27 P.2d 655, 658 (1933). But see Fouracre v. White,
31 Del. 25, -, 102 A. 186, 196 (Super. Ct. 1917).
200. Commonwealth v. Shawell, 325 Pa. 497, 504, 191 A. 17, 19 (1936); Moritz
v. Luzerne County, 283 Pa. 349, 351, 129 A. 85, 86 (1925).
201. An archaic but descriptive example of the conflict raised by this question
concerns the issue whether tribunals that determine the results of contested elections
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
B. The Meaning of Resultant Harm
To meet the requirement of resultant harm, the petitioner must
prove that the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial power will cause
immediate harm unless forestalled. 2 ' Mere apprehension of injury is
insufficient. 208  This rule was strictly interpreted in Application of
Tribune Review Publishing Co. 20 4  In that case a newspaper sought
to prohibit enforcement of a court of common pleas rule banning
photographers from the courthouse. The petition was dismissed
because no photographer had disobeyed the court order and, there-
fore, the ban had not yet actually harmed petitioner.20 5
Similarly, once the restraining effect of prohibition becomes
unnecessary or useless, the writ cannot properly lie. 20 6 For instance,
the supreme court may find that an inferior court lacked authority to
act, but simultaneously it will render that finding moot by ruling that
the statute under which the court acted is unconstitutional.20 7 Prohi-
bition also does not properly lie when an act is already completed. At
that point an affirmative remedy is required. 08 On the other hand,
when court orders are sought to be restrained, the controlling consid-
eration is whether an order's effect is continuing. If the force of an
order has "not been spent, nor its capacity for harm exhausted,"
exercise judicial or quasi-judicial powers. The supreme court has held that a compu-
tation board comprised of two common pleas judges exercised quasi-judicial functions
in determining whether the allegations of fraud were sufficient to order an opening
of the ballot boxes. This ruling was made despite the court's acknowledgment of the
statutory instruction that the inquiry "shall not be deemed a judicial adjudication to
conclude any contest." In re First Cong. Dist. Election, 295 Pa. 1, 8, 144 A. 735,
737 (1928).
Other courts have held, however, that even a final adjudication of an election
is not an exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial authority because the power to make
this determination falls within the realm of the legislature by constitutional provision.
McWhorter v. Dorr, 57 W. Va. 608, 615-16, 50 S.E. 838, 840 (1905).
202. People ex rel. Childs v. Extraordinary Trial Term of Supreme Court, 228
N.Y. 463, 467-68, 127 N.E. 486, 487 (1920); Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v.
Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 98, 61 A.2d 426, 428 (1948); Reader, Judicial Review of "Final"
Administrative Decisions in Pennsylvania, 67 DICK. L. REv. 1, 23 (1962).
203. People ex rel. Childs v. Extraordinary Trial Term of Supreme Court, 228
N.Y. 463, 468, 127 N.E. 486, 487 (1920); Application of Tribune Review Pub. Co.,
379 Pa. 92, 94, 113 A.2d 861 (1954).
204. 379 Pa. 92, 113 A.2d 861 (1954).
205. Id. at 94, 113 A.2d at 861.
206. United States v. Hoffman, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 158 (1866); Jacobson v. Su-
perior Court, 1 Ariz. App. 342, 344, 402 P.2d 1018, 1018-20 (1965); People ex rel.
Livingston v. Wyatt, 186 N.Y. 383, 394, 79 N.E. 330, 334 (1906); 3 K. DAvis, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 416 (1st ed. 1958).
207. Petition of Park, 329 Pa. 60, 63, 196 A. 495, 496 (1938).
208. United States v. Hoffman, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 158 (1866).
prohibition will lie to prevent further injury.2091 Even when final
judgment has been entered, a writ can issue if the lack of jurisdiction
is clear.210  Nevertheless, the manifest inequity that arises when a
litigant allows a trial to proceed to conclusion before he alleges lack
of jurisdiction may inveigh against its issuance.
C. The Meaning of Adequate Remedy
A fundamental rule states that a writ of prohibition cannot be
granted if another adequate remedy is available to the petitioner.211
Generally matters that can be remedied on appeal cannot be checked
by prohibition. Even though an appeal subsequently may provide a
remedy, however, a petitioner need not endure a full trial if he can
show the proceedings to be void ab initio.21 2
In Pennsylvania the adequacy of appeal issue most often arises
in cases in which an interlocutory order is sought to be restrained.
Prohibition is properly denied in this situation because a case cannot
be appealed in piecemeal fashion; judicial proceedings would be
unduly prolonged and chaotic. 1 3 The expense, inconvenience, or
other hardship of awaiting an appeal of an interlocutory order will
not justify issuance of a writ of prohibition.21 4 The supreme court
has denied prohibitory relief even when contempt was the only re-
maining avenue by which an unsatisfied petitioner could preserve
rights of appeal.21 5
In criminal cases, however, the supreme court will grant prohibi-
tion against interlocutory orders.2 18  The writ is available to restrain
an order permitting defendant's pretrial inspection of physicial evi-
209. People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 35, 156 N.E. 84, 87
(1927) (Cardozo, C.J.). This principle was applied in a Pennsylvania case when a
judge's order to padlock petitioners' offices for allegedly seditious activities was prop-
erly restrained. Petition of Communist Party, 365 Pa. 549, 550, 75 A.2d 583
(1950).
210. HIGH, supra note 69, at 559; Hughes & Brown, supra note 1, at 838.
211. Pirillo v. Takiff, - Pa. -, -,341 A.2d 896, 900 (1975).
212. Bennett v. District Court, 81 Okla. Crim. 351, 357, 162 P.2d 561, 565
(1945); State ex rel. City of Huntington v. Lombardo, 149 W. Va. 671, 683, 143
S.E.2d 535, 541 (1965).
213. Commonwealth v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 360 Pa. 103, 109, 61
A.2d 430, 434 (1948).
214. Whitehouse v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 349 U.S. 366, 374 (1955); United States
Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 202 (1945); Borough of Akron
v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 453 Pa. 554, 562, 310 A.2d 271, 275 (1973).
215. Petition of Specter, 455 Pa. 518, 519, 317 A.2d 286, 287 (1974); In re
Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 267, 126 A.2d 679, 702 (1956); Commonwealth v. Mellon Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 360 Pa. 103, 113, 61 A.2d 430, 434 (1948) (vigorous dissent).
216. See Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Shiomos, 457 Pa. 104, 108, 320 A.2d
134, 136 (1974); Lewis v. Court of Common Pleas, 436 Pa. 296, 299, 260 A.2d 184,
186-87 (1969); Commonwealth v. Caplan, 411 Pa. 563, 568, 192 A.2d 894, 897
(1963); In re DiJoseph, 394 Pa. 19, 21, 145 A.2d 187, 189 (1958); Commonwealth





dence within the prosecutor's possession. 17 Although this order
reflects an exercise of discretion by the trial judge rather than the
abuse or lack of jurisdiction conceptually required for prohibition, the




This brief examination of prohibition in Pennsylvania has fo-
cused upon theoretical and practical facets of this traditionally ob-
scure subject. The conflicts and suggested resolutions presented
chiefly concern academic aspects of prohibition, but practitioners
should be familiar with its existence as a viable procedural device that
can provide relief to an otherwise remediless client. Practitioners
also should be aware of the distinction between prohibition and other
extraordinary writs because confusion in this regard can lead to costly
delays in litigation while amended petitions are adjudicated.
It is difficult to discern trends in the exercise of prohibition in
Pennsylvania because the majority of cases before the supreme court
are resolved in memorandum decisions and go unrecorded. An
extrapolation of available decisions reveals, however, that the su-
preme court's exercise of prohibition is increasing dramatically. Most
significantly, the court no longer strictly adheres to the rule demand-
ing a lack of jurisdiction as a prerequisite to issuance of a prohibitory
writ. On the contrary, the court has shown a willingness, especially in
the area of criminal law, to exercise the power of prohibition even in
instances when the only alleged excess of authority is an abuse of
discretion.
JOHN A. COVINO
217. In Lewis v. Court of Common Pleas, 436 Pa. 296, 300, 260 A.2d 184, 188
(1969), the district attorney's petition for prohibition of the trial court's order to
make available an FBI agent for interview by defendant was denied because the agent
was not considered physical evidence within the possession of the Commonwealth.
Such classification precluded any issue in prohibition. See PA. R. CGiM. P. 310.
218. Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Shiomos, 457 Pa. 104, 108, 320 A.2d 134,
136 (1974).
